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Abstract 
The recent increase in transnational acquisitions of agrarian land raises concerns 
about rural people’s inadequate involvement in the decision-making process, and 
violations of their land rights. Tanzania’s statutory land laws are comparatively 
progressive in terms of recognising customary land rights. According to the 
legislation, transferring ‘Village Land’ to an investor requires villagers’ approval. 
It is therefore interesting to focus on the acknowledgement of customary rights in 
land deals in Tanzania. This study analyses the land transfer process of a UK-
based forestry company that has acquired land in seven villages in the Kilolo 
District. In the case of the village presented here, the investor seems to have 
followed the legal procedure regarding decision-making for the land deal in a 
formally correct way. Yet interviews with various stakeholders revealed flaws at 
village and district government level that have led to a conflictive situation, with 
numerous affected villagers having lost their land rights – and thus the basis for 
their livelihoods – against their will. Among those affected are several 
households from a neighbouring village, whose customary rights date back to the 
period before the resettlements of the 1970s (‘villagization’). Employing the 
concepts of property rights and legal pluralism1 and unbundling the role of 
different actors in the host country government, this article analyses the decision-
making process that preceded this land transfer. It illustrates how unequal power 
relations lead to unequal recognition of customary and statutory law. The study 
concludes that even under comparatively favourable legal conditions, there is no 
guarantee that local land rights are fully protected in the global land rush.  
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 2 
In recent years there has been rapid growth in the number of investors acquiring large 
tracts of agrarian land in countries of the Global South for food, agrofuel or forestry 
plantations and many other purposes. The investors are from Western and Gulf states, 
but also from countries of the Global South, including domestic actors.2 This increase in 
land investments has provoked numerous hopes and worries regarding their impacts in 
the host countries. Supporters claim that land investments entail new income options in 
terms of jobs or contract farming and improved technologies and infrastructure in rural 
areas. Critics are concerned about violations of land rights and, ultimately, increased 
poverty and food insecurity in the respective areas.3 Yet, also supporters recognise 
certain, but they hold that these can be minimized by improving governance of land 
deals, for example by implementing international guidelines.4 
Tanzania is considered a land-abundant country5 and is thus a typical target 
country for current land deals – initially mainly for biofuels, but more recently for 
diverse purposes.6 This article focuses on the case of a UK-based forestry company. 
Considering the expected global increase of forestry plantations, the study contributes to 
the so far limited scholar knowledge about such investments.7 
As in most African countries, customary land rights play a major role in rural 
areas in Tanzania. The statutory legislation is comparatively progressive in terms of 
respecting existing local land rights – referred to as customary rights (see section 2.1) – 
and requiring rural people’s approval to land deals. It is therefore interesting to focus on 
a Tanzanian case study in order to see whether a favourable legal setting can protect 
rural inhabitants from negative implications of large-scale land deals. This study argues 
that it is important not only to focus on the land acquisition process, but also to analyse 
it in the context of the local land tenure regime – an aspect that other studies have often 
neglected. The paper looks at the matter from the perspective of legal pluralism so as to 
give sufficient consideration to complex land tenure settings. Further, this study argues 
with Wolford and her colleagues that the global land rush phenomenon should not be 
seen in oversimplified ways as land grabs by “predatory investors”8; rather it is 
important to acknowledge and unbundle the involvement of host country governments 
in such deals – an issue for which not much empirical evidence has been published until 
recently.9 This article presents a detailed and nuanced analysis of the influence of 
institutions as well as specific stakeholders and their interaction.  
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3 
The empirical work was mainly undertaken between August 2010 and May 
2011. At that time, the selected forestry company was at an advanced stage of acquiring 
land in the Kilolo District in Iringa Region. The data are based on qualitative interviews 
with government officials at national, regional, district and village levels, and with 
inhabitants including key persons using semi-structured interview guidelines. In the two 
affected villages presented in this case study, group discussions and participatory 
mapping exercises were also conducted and copies of the minutes of village meetings 
were collected. Further information was obtained in 2013 from the district land officer. 
Apart from one preliminary meeting in August 2010, the investing company did not 
agree to contribute to this study. Therefore information about the company is mainly 
derived from its website and from district officials and other sources. Relevant 
background information for this research was provided by a study conducted by Chambi 
Chachage and Bernard Baha who visited the area in May 2010.10 
In the following section, I will introduce the concepts of property and legal 
pluralism. The second section provides an overview on the Tanzanian land regime and 
the legal regulations related to land transactions. It is followed by basic information 
about the investment project and a detailed description of the land deal procedure. The 
fourth section presents an analysis of the transaction process. The article ends with a 
discussion and conclusion. 
Analytical framework for the analysis of property 
Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Melanie Wiber describe property as a 
broad concept, which “concerns the ways in which the relations between society’s 
members with respect to valuables are given form and significance”.11 They define three 
major elements in relation to property:  
(a) the social unit that can hold rights and obligations (in this case individuals, the 
village, the Tanzanian government and the company); 
(b) the (constructed) property objects (e.g. a given plot of land); 
(c) the various sets of rights and obligations with respect to such objects. 
Property rights can be broadly divided into two categories, namely rights to use and 
exploit economically; and rights to regulate, allocate, represent in outside relations and 
make decisions – in short decision-making rights.12  
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 4 
Benda-Beckmann and his colleagues further distinguish four “layers of social 
organization”13 in which property is expressed: 
• Layer (1): cultural ideals and ideologies (e.g. neo-liberalism or socialism) 
• Layer (2): legal regulations (e.g. state law, customary law or religious law) 
• Layer (3): social relationships (e.g. between landowner and tenant) 
• Layer (4): social practices or daily interactions (e.g. inheriting land or fencing) 
Since property regimes evolve over time, the four layers of such a regime are not 
always fully coherent. Different legal regimes may coexist, each of them based on 
legislations such as statutory law or customary law, supported by respective sets of 
cultural values, and determining property relationships and practices. These regimes 
may coexist peacefully or be in open conflict, and may also influence each other. Such 
coexistence and interaction of legal regimes is referred to as legal pluralism.14  
In the context of legal pluralism, people may refer to different property 
ideologies and legal regulations to justify and support their claims.15 However, it is not 
enough to assert claims. According to Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan “Rights are only as 
strong as the institutions or collectivity that stands behind them”. 16 In this study I used 
the presented concepts to analyse the local property regime and to reveal the social 
relations that are relevant for the recognition of customary and statutory land rights 
during the land transaction. 
Legal provisions for allocating Village Land to a foreign investor 
Tanzania’s land regime and land legislation 
Tanzania’s land regime is based on local laws, religious laws and German and British 
colonial laws. Further, during the 1970s, the resettlements under the ‘villagization’ 
programme (operation vijiji, introduced by President Nyerere’s socialist government) 
brought major changes to the land tenure situation.17 The current law, subdivided into 
the Land Act and the Village Land Act, came into force in May 2001.18 
Based on former colonial law, the Land Acts retain all land as public land. Land 
is vested in the President, who holds the final decision-making rights as trustee on 
behalf of all citizens. Citizens cannot own land, but they can own rights over the land, 
i.e. rights to occupy and use land.19 ‘Rights to occupy’ may be bought or sold, and 
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5 
inherited, and can thus be seen as (limited) decision-making rights. In this article 
citizens with such decision-making rights are refer to as ‘landholders’, not 
‘landowners’.20 
All land in Tanzania is divided into three classes with different jurisdictions. 
‘General Land’ is administered by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban 
Development (hereafter, Ministry of Lands) and comprises urban areas and land that has 
been allocated by the central government under entitlements, e.g. to investors. Land 
rights granted under this category can be hold for 33, 66 or 99 years. ‘Reserved Land’ 
refers to several specific types and uses of land such as forests, national parks or 
highways, and is governed by the relevant Ministries.21 
‘Village Land’ includes the areas of all villages, representing roughly two-thirds 
of Tanzanian land. Village Land is managed by the respective Village Council (VC), the 
elected government of 15-25 members. The VC is accountable to the Village Assembly 
(VA), which consists of all residents above 18 years. Village Land can be further sub-
divided in three categories. Communal village land is used for public purposes such as 
schools or grazing areas. Individual land is occupied or used by an individual, family or 
group of persons. The third category is unnamed but may be referred to as spare land 
for future communal or individual use.22 
A main purpose of the Village Land Act is to protect villagers’ existing rights. 
Existing rights in rural areas are referred to as customary rights. The VC shall 
administer the land in accordance with customary law, provided this does not violate the 
main provisions of the statutory law, such as the rights of women, children or the 
disabled.23 In fact, it might be questionable to term existing rights in Tanzania 
‘customary’, given the state’s strong influence during villagization and through the land 
legislation.24 Yet, I argue with Knight that parts of the customs are preserved, and thus 
that the Tanzanian legislation can be termed a “customary/statutory hybrid”.25 
According to the Village Land Act, a ‘customary right of occupancy’ (on Village Land) 
has the same legal status as given to land titles to ‘General Land’. Customary rights also 
explicitly include unregistered rights.26 Tanzanian legislation is thus praised as a 
progressive land law compared to other African countries in terms of respecting 
customary land rights and entrusting land management responsibilities to village 
bodies.27 
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Transfer of Village Land to a foreign investor 
Non-Tanzanian citizens cannot acquire customary rights of occupancy. They can only 
obtain land for investment purposes.28 There are different possibilities for doing so.29 
The most common way is to identify suitable plots of ‘Village Land’, which are 
transferred to the category of ‘General Land’, whereupon the Ministry of Lands can 
provide title deeds to the investor. In more detail, the usual procedure – which also 
applied to the presented case – is as follows. Investors,together with regional or district 
government authorities, visit villages with potentially suitable land and inform the VC 
and VA about their plans. If the VA in general agrees with the project, the district land 
officers demarcate the respective land plot(s) and send the relevant VA minutes to the 
Ministry of Lands. Thereafter, the following de jure process of land transfer starts.30 
The Ministry of Lands gazettes a 90 day notice with information about the intended 
transfer and sends it to the respective VC. The VC shall inform all people that might be 
affected by such a land transfer in terms of losing customary land rights. The affected 
people can make representations to the VC or authorised district land officers31, who 
shall take these into account for the further procedure. 
Based on recommendations from the VC, the VA can either approve or reject 
the land transfer in the case of areas below 250 hectares, and its decision is submitted to 
the President. In the case of areas above 250 hectares, the VA can only provide a 
recommendation, while the decision lies in the hands of the President. The President can 
order the compulsory acquisition of land, subject to the payment of compensation.32 
However, it seems that in this context the President does not usually take a decision 
against the VA’s recommendation.33 During the VA meeting, a district land officer and 
the investor are supposed to be present and answer questions. Thereafter, the type, 
amount, method and timing of the payment of compensation have to be agreed between 
the government – in practice usually the investor – and the affected villagers (in case of 
individual land) or the VC (in case of communal or spare land). Based on a detailed 
survey and assessment of the land, a compensation schedule must be prepared and 
approved by the central government. Finally, the transfer of the land is gazetted in a 
second notice and becomes effective within 30 days. Thereupon, within six months, 
either the government or the investor himself is supposed to pay compensation to the 
land right-holders. Compensation has to be paid for the value of the land itself and for 
‘unexhausted improvements’, namely constructions, crops or trees on the land. 
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Additional compensation may include, among others, resettlement fees and transport 
allowances. The valuation shall be based on the current market value.34  
The land acquisition process of the UK-based forestry company in Kilolo 
District 
The New Forests Company in Kilolo District 
Kilolo is a hilly district in Iringa Region, located in the Southern Highlands of 
Tanzania. It features favourable conditions for the cultivation of food crops such as 
maize, beans, potatoes, vegetables and fruit. Many households also plant trees on some 
of their plots. Further, high demand for timber in Tanzania and abroad has attracted 
wealthy individuals from other Tanzanian regions who acquire land and grow pine, 
eucalyptus, cypress and other fast-growing trees. 
The UK-based New Forests Company (NFC) presents itself as a sustainable 
forestry business with the aim of producing feed material for sawmills, board factories 
and pole treatment plants, and running energy-forestry operations based on plantations 
in Uganda, Mozambique and Tanzania. The company expects “both attractive returns to 
investors and significant social and environmental benefits”. 35 
In 2006, the district’s Member of Parliament introduced NFC to Kilolo District. 
By early 2013, NFC had acquired 6,300 hectares of land in seven villages and was still 
in the process of acquiring more land. In most cases the deal involves individual land 
holdings, but in the case presented here, some village spare land was also affected. In 
the following section, I shall first show how government officials and the investor 
proceeded, drawing on statutory law, and how this led to conflicts. Subsequently, I shall 
present the relevant customary tenure regime in order to analyse in more detail the land 
deal process and its implications. 
Initial steps in the land acquisition process in Kidabaga 
In 2006, representatives of the NFC and of Kilolo District visited several villages and 
presented the company’s plans in VC and VA meetings. According to the minutes, both 
of these meetings took place on 18 October 2006 in the case of village Kidabaga.36 
Even at that early stage the VC members agreed to offersome village spare land to the 
investor. The area, called Witamasiva, is located in a sub-village roughly 15 kilometres 
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away from the main settlement of Kidabaga. Parts of the area had been temporarily 
rented out to individuals. The information about the remaining area remained unclear; it 
was either unused or cultivated in parts by people from the neighbouring village 
Kiwalamo. However, the proposal to offer Witamasiva to the investor was presented to 
the VA. The minutes of the meeting show that the aims of the NFC were presented as a 
long list of benefits besides their core activities, including “create 10,000 jobs” and 
“engage in the provision of education, health, water, etc.” 37 Although villagers raised 
few concerns during that meeting, the VA agreed unanimously to provide Witamasiva 
to the NFC.38 
The VA then formed a committee of six villagers responsible for showing the 
Witamasiva area to district officials. The first demarcation took place on 17 August 
2007. A survey team from the district and NFC officials went to the respective area, 
together with the village committee. According to numerous interview partners, 
including a member of the committee at the time, this committee under the late Village 
Chairman did not show the precise boundary of Witamasiva, but merely pointed at it 
from afar. Apparently, the committee leader did not originally come from that area and 
did not know it properly. Hence the land survey team demarcated a much larger area 
than the land called Witamasiva. Yet this only came to light later.  
On the basis of the generally positive signal from Kidabaga and other villages, 
the government gazetted a first notice on 6 February 2008. In this notice the President 
proposed the transfer of Village Land to General Land in several villages including 
Kidabaga.39 The site and actual size of land that was supposed to be transferred in each 
village was not mentioned, although this is legally required.40  
On 11 April 2008 – thus within the given period of 90 days from the publication 
of the government notice – the district officials provided the information about the 
proposed transfer to the villagers of Kidabaga at a VC and VA meeting. Interestingly, 
the minutes of both meetings featured a blank space in which the size of the proposed 
land should have been indicated.41 This is remarkable, because on that date the district 
officials must at least have known the approximate size of the land, which they had 
demarcated nearly a year before.  
According to the minutes, several questions were raised. A VC member asked 
about compensation for properties on the land, and one member specifically asked about 
compensation for people from the neighbouring village Kiwalamo who were using the 
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9 
land. This indicates that VC members already knew or at least suspected that the land 
transfer would affect several people, and the district officials were made aware of this. 
Yet it is reported that the district officials continued confirming that the land to be 
transferred would only include spare land managed by the VC, and that property of 
individuals would be avoided as far as possible. If people should nonetheless be 
affected, they would be compensated.42 According to the understanding of a villager I 
interviewed in his subsequent position as Village Chairman of Kidabaga in 2010, it was 
agreed that a survey would take place first and the compensation issue would be 
clarified before the village and the company entered into an agreement. In this vague 
situation, the (potentially) affected people were reportedly not informed by the VC.  
However, despite the lack of clarity about land size and potentially affected 
people, the minutes were considered as the VA’s recommendation to approve the 
proposed land transfer. 
Survey and first agreement on compensation  
According to a district official, the village had consented to receive compensation in 
cash for the used part of the land only, specifically for the trees planted by the 
individual villagers . For the remaining area of Witamasiva, the village reportedly did 
not ask for compensation in cash, arguing that the land was not used.43  
In July 2008, after the expiry of the 90-day period, the district officials 
conducted a survey and an evaluation exercise at the same time, thus laying the final 
steps for the land transfer. They placed beacons and filled in forms regarding 
compensation, which were signed by the people who had planted trees and by the 
Village Chairman and the Village Executive Officer (VEO), an employed secretary to 
the VC, on behalf of the village. It was then, at the very latest, that at least the village 
representatives must have seen the exact boundary, as their signature is mandatory for 
setting up the beacons.44 The total area provided to NFC in Kidabaga was 1,572.8 
hectares.45 However, the villagers seem to have been unaware of this figure. 
Transfer of land and arising confusion and conflicts 
At a VA meeting on 30 March 2009 the VC informed villagers of Kidabaga that their 
village had received 1.6 million Tanzanian Shillings in compensation. According to the 
minutes, a number of villagers were neither satisfied with the amount nor, in particular, 
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with the lack of clarity about the size of the land. They also complained that some extra 
land had been given to the investor. They asked the village government to follow up on 
this.46  
Four months later, on 30 July 2009, the VEO of Kidabaga invited the respective 
people to meet in the contested area. He found the complaints justified; the area that had 
been surveyed one year earlier did indeed include land held by individuals outside the 
area known as Witamasiva. Thereafter, on 23 August 2009, some affected villagers 
from both Kidabaga and Kiwalamo wrote a formal letter to the VEO, stating that they 
did not agree to give any land besides Witamasiva, and that they did not want to receive 
any compensation for the individual land, but wanted their land back. The letter should 
have been forwarded to the district or some other relevant body, but it is not clear 
whether this happened.  
At roughly the same time, on 21 August 2009, the second government notice 
was published, announcing that the transfer of Village Land to General Land would be 
effective within 30 days.47 In December 2009 NFC started to clear some land in 
Witamasiva and planted the first seedlings. The company apparently had received a go 
ahead from the district government and used the land before having received the title 
deed from the Ministry of Lands.  
It took several more complaints by local people before another VA meeting was 
held in January 2010; there, the villagers of Kidabaga confirmed their position and the 
VEO forwarded their complaints to the district. Finally, the district recognised the 
claims of the affected people. However, the land had already been deemed General 
Land half a year before. District officials proposed that the affected villagers should be 
compensated. The former landholders announced their acceptance – albeit reluctantly in 
some cases – at a meeting on 24 March 2010. Some former landholders mentioned that 
they had been urged to sign the agreement with threats that they would otherwise 
receive nothing, while losing the land in any case. In August 2010 NFC recognised the 
villagers’ legitimate claims too and agreed to pay compensation to those who had been 
left out before. The company also consented to pay for the second survey that was 
required as a basis for the new compensation schedule. 
The September 2010 survey revealed that the demarcated area did not just cover 
Witamasiva but also included areas with land rights held by around 100 individuals. It 
was found that about half of these rights were held by people from the neighbouring 
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village Kiwalamo. I shall briefly outline the history of Witamasiva in the following 
section to give a better understanding of the reasons for this land property order.  
Customary land tenure in the area acquired by the company  
Before the villagization programme in 1973, the people in the area had been living in 
dispersed settlements. During the villagization process, people living around 
Witamasiva moved in different directions to form the villages of Kidabaga and 
Kiwalamo. However, the border between the two new villages was reportedly drawn by 
government officials in such a way that all land around Witamasiva now belongs 
administratively to Kidabaga. 
When the people moved to the place called Kiwalamo to form a village, they 
were instructed by government officials to rearrange their land rights. The people who 
had been living in the area of the present core settlement of Kiwalamo before were 
instructed to share their land with newcomers so that the latter could establish a new 
household. As the available land was not enough for farming and other uses, the new 
arrivals continued to use the land around their former homes in addition to their newly 
allocated land. In turn, people who had originally lived in the area of the current village 
were given land use rights in part of the areas around Witamasiva that had been 
abandoned by the people moving to the new village. The effect of this rearrangement 
was that up to the present day most households in Kiwalamo have land rights both 
within and outside the village settlement area, whereas a major part of the area outside 
the settlement belongs to Kidabaga. To the minds of local people, this exchange of land 
rights was not carried out in the sense of an exchange of land holdings, but rather in the 
sense of a permanent or long-term exchange of land use rights. In other words: people 
who had been living in the area around Witamasiva still consider themselves to be 
entitled to that land, but part of that land is regarded as tantamount to being ‘rented’ to 
those people in Kiwalamo who in turn ‘rented’ part of their land to people from 
Witamasiva. This ‘rent’ or exchange of land use rights involves no payment. If a 
newcomer to the village (for example teachers) wished to get land rights, he or she 
needed to buy it from the original settler on that land. 
From the perspective of elders interviewed in Kiwalamo, land tenure is 
regulated through mutual acceptance among villagers. In their view, villages are 
administrative institutions with no particular power over land property. Although they 
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recognise that their land is located within the boundaries of Kidabaga, the villagers I 
interviewed still feel that it belongs to them. 
Revised land survey and compensation agreement 
In the second survey, in 2010, only a small part of around 2.8 hectares was considered 
Kidabaga’s spare land; this was the area that had already been compensated. The 
remaining area of around 1,570 hectares in Kidabaga, which had been provided free of 
charge, was categorised as land held by individuals, both from Kidabaga and Kiwalamo. 
District officials I interviewed claimed that it was only then that they had realised that 
Witamasiva was merely a small proportion of the total area. In the renewed 
compensation schedule based on that survey, the customary land rights illustrated above 
were taken into account in the following way. Former landholders in the area, both from 
Kidabaga and Kiwalamo, were listed as being entitled to compensation for land plus 
unexhausted improvements (crops and trees), if there were any. The people from 
Kiwalamo who had been ‘renting’ the land were supposed to be compensated only for 
unexhausted improvements. As there was no settlement on the transferred land, no 
related compensation had been foreseen. The total compensation amounted to 
687,645,900 Tanzanian Shillings (around USD 455,000 in 2010). There was some 
discussion between the village governments of Kidabaga and Kiwalamo regarding the 
land held by villagers of Kiwalamo. The government of Kidabaga was of the opinion 
that its VC, the formal manager of land within village boundaries according to statutory 
law, was also entitled to compensation. Finally, it was agreed that compensation be paid 
to the individual landholders after deducting 2% for Kidabaga. 
Although the new compensation schedule had been ready since November 2010, 
NFC hesitated to accept the new survey and only paid the compensation at the end of 
2011. Reportedly, the Regional Office had adviced the district officials to hold back the 
company’s title deed until it paid the compensation. 
Immediate consequences for local land rights and livelihoods in the villages 
Kidabaga and Kiwalamo 
Part of the area around Witamasiva was used when NFC arrived in 2006. Cultivation 
was largely concentrated on more fertile land closer to rivers and included food crops 
and trees, while some of the drier hills were used for grazing cattle. 
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A solution was found for the dispersed plots of grazing area that people lost; 
another neighbouring village gave part of its communal land as a common grazing area. 
The situation proved far more tense regarding land for cultivation. Since 2009 
representatives of the company and the local government had told the former land users 
that it would be illegal for them to continue using the land, as it belonged to NFC. 
While some affected households still had land elsewhere, others, mainly from 
Kiwalamo, complained about their complete loss of subsistence farmland, reduced food 
security and a lack of income to cover expenditure such as school fees. Some villagers 
from Kidabaga shifted their activities to new land, which they rented from other 
inhabitants. Given that they had not yet received the compensation by then, they argued 
that they were unable to buy land and lost a considerable amount of money paying the 
annual rent. 
In Kiwalamo, the agreement based on the second survey had further complex 
consequences. From a point of view of customary law, people who had been living 
around Witamasiva earlier lost all of their landholdings for which they had decision-
making rights. The land within the settlement on which they have built their homes is 
regarded as having been ‘rented’ and is therefore considered less secure. The other 
people from Kiwalamo lost ‘only’ land use rights, albeit long-standing ones. They were 
therefore not compensated for loss of land, only for crops. There was no spare arable 
land in Kiwalamo under the management of the VC that could have been distributed 
among the affected villagers, and it seemed that there was also no substantial amount of 
individual land that might have been bought or rented from other villagers. Some of the 
people therefore argued that they would have to move away and try to find land for 
settlement and cultivation in another region. As they would probably be unable to find 
land for all the affected households in the same place, they feared that they would be 
scattered in different villages, disrupting existing ties among relatives and neighbours. 
However, I was unable to explore this development any further within the time frame of 
this research. 
Conceptual analysis: “How come others are selling our land?” 
In the area around Witamasiva – which is located within the boundaries of Kidabaga, 
but partly used by villagers of Kiwalamo – customary and statutory land orders have 
coexisted since the 1970s without creating major tensions. However, their discrepancy 
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became obvious when the investor sought to acquire the land.48 On the one hand, 
affected former landholders from Kiwalamo feel that it is their land, based on long-
standing customary rights. This view is partly shared by their neighbours from 
Kidabaga. It is obvious that these land claims grounded in customary law were not 
protected. Thus an elder man from Kiwalamo asked:  
How come others are selling our land? 
On the other hand, some of the inhabitants and village representatives in Kidabaga feel 
that they rightfully decided to transfer Witamasiva – and accidentally also some area 
around Witamasiva; they claim that it is their village’s land. One interviewee from 
Kidabaga said:  
Witamasiva was at that time [when the VA decided to give it to the investor] used 
by people from Kiwalamo, with the permission of Kidabaga, but only temporarily. 
It was generally known that it belongs to Kidabaga, and that Kidabaga could take it 
back when needed. 
This view refers to the legislation as set in the statutory law, which views the VA as the 
legitimate institution for taking decisions about any land within village boundaries. 
The decision-making for the land transfer followed not the customary law cited 
by some villagers of Kiwalamo and Kidabaga, but statutory law – though not without 
considerable flaws, as will be discussed in further detail below. According to Meinzen-
Dick and Pradhan, it can be concluded that the legitimising institution behind the 
statutory law was stronger than the collectivity behind the customary law.49 Although 
customary law is integrated into Tanzanian state law (see section 2.1), from the 
perspective of legal pluralism it makes sense to present the two laws and their backing 
institutions and stakeholders in juxtaposition, in order to illustrate the discrepancies 
between the two regulations and the related consequences. 
The recognition of statutory and customary law  
When foreign investors wish to acquire land in rural areas, they draw on statutory law – 
publicly accessible regulations that are promoted by the national government. The 
legitimising institution behind the statutory law is obviously the state. Not only the 
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investor, but also the villagers and VC members I interviewed generally respected the 
Tanzanian state and never fundamentally questioned it in our interactions. When it 
comes to land issues in Kidabaga and Kiwalamo, the state is usually represented by the 
district officials. District officials generally enjoy a high level of respect from local 
people, including VC members. They have a certain knowledge about state law50, which 
they have acquired through formal education, and the power to implement legal 
procedures by dint of their position. Villagers’ respect is also indicated in the minutes of 
the VC and VA, which refer respectfully to “experts” from the district.51 In the 
presented case, the Member of Parliament for Kilolo and a former Cabinet Minister, 
who accompanied the representatives of the district and NFC in some of their 
promotional meetings, further strengthened the authority of the district officials. At one 
stage in the process the President even came into play – namely when he (in fact rather 
the Commissioner of Lands on the President’s behalf52), as per legal requirement, 
finally effected the land transfer. Affected villagers from Kiwalamo and Kidabaga were 
informed accordingly that the decision was “signed by the President”, as interviewees 
often quoted officials. The reference to this figure of authority contributed to villagers’ 
feeling that they had no other option than to come to terms with the transfer. 
The villagers I interviewed not only respected the state, but the statutory land 
law too. Even people negatively affected by the land deal did not question the law as 
such. Though they did not know much about it in detail, they expected the law to be 
designed in a way that it would protect their rights, if implemented properly. In sum, 
statutory law and its backing institution – the state and its representatives – are 
recognised by all stakeholders involved. 
Customary law is sustained by villagers who have lived in the area for 
generations. They claim that numerous mutual and often long-standing agreements 
among individuals in a community constitute the land tenure order, and that village 
boundaries have no particular effect in the issue of use rights to members of 
neighbouring villages. As I have outlined above, to some extent statutory law 
recognises customary law as the main basis for land governance in villages. From the 
state’s point of view, the VC is responsible for the management of Village Land. But 
the elected VC has authority from a local point of view too. Village councillors are 
usually respected and comparatively knowledgeable members of the village community. 
External stakeholders usually come to the VC to identify land in a given village. Yet, as 
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I have shown, it can be very difficult for village representatives to know about and 
identify all local arrangements. Thus VC members may not always be fully able to back 
customary rights.53 
My analysis of the institutions and social relations reveals that statutory law –
broadly recognized among stakeholders and promoted by respected authorities – has 
more powerful backing than customary law, which is only fully recognised and 
maintained by groups of villagers. The village government has a challenging double 
role in this regard, since it represents both statutory and customary laws. 
Flaws in the implementation of the land transfer process according to statutory 
law 
Statutory law was the basis for the land deal, but numerous errors hampered the 
implementation. They happened both at village and district levels. 
(a) The committee of village representatives approved by the VA in 2006 was 
responsible for showing the land to the district officials, but apparently did not 
fulfil its task properly.  
(b) In the April 2008 meetings, when the VC and VA were officially informed 
about the intended land transfer based on the government notice, the district 
officials reportedly did not inform them about the size of the area, even though 
the plot had already been demarcated for transfer. 
(c) After that, the VC of Kidabaga did not inform all affected villagers in Kidabaga 
and Kiwalamo about the proposed land transfer, even though village councillors 
must have known or at least suspected that holders of land rights were affected. 
Had the VC informed them at the time, people would have had time to raise 
objections within the period set by the first government notice.  
(d) Instead of taking the hints about affected right-holders in the above-mentioned 
meetings seriously and trying to get a clearer basis for the rest of the process, the 
district government interpreted the VA meeting as a sign of approval for the land 
deal. 
(e) Village government representatives did not react in a timely manner to clarify 
and report the problems when doubts regarding the size of the land and 
compensation were raised at a VA meeting in March 2009, and when villagers 
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from Kidabaga and Kiwalamo complained in different ways. By the time they 
finally looked into the matter, the land transfer had become effective.  
(f) When the claims of the affected people were finally accepted, one legal 
requirement for the land transfer – namely the agreement on compensation by all 
affected stakeholders – was no longer fulfilled. One could argue that the basic 
requirement – the VA recommendation to approve the land transfer – had also 
become weak or void, as the VA decision had been taken on the basis of missing 
and false assumptions. However, instead of restarting the whole process, the 
district protected the investor’s land claim and strove to delivering the legal 
basis for the land transfer as quickly as possible by asking the former 
landholders to agree to the compensation. The fact that NFC had already planted 
on the land – with the go-ahead of the district government – helped to strengthen 
the company’s claim and stir up a belief among local people that the land 
transfer could not be undone.  
The following two issues, related to the Village Council’s role, do not conflict with 
legal regulations regarding the land transfer, but had an impact nonetheless.  
(g) Only affected people, not the entire VA, were invited to the March 2010 meeting 
at which the former landholders were requested to sign the acceptance of 
compensation. Some interviewees, including a well-informed businessman who 
was not personally affected, felt that the village government had done this 
intentionally. Without the support of the other villagers, some of whom were 
more educated, the landholders had less power to resist such a request.  
(h) Overall, villagers’ respect for the VC influenced the decision-making at the VA. 
This was illustrated when I asked about their first meeting with NFC. Most of 
the interviewees in Kidabaga did not feel that they had taken the decision of 
giving Witamasiva to NFC, despite having participated in the respective VA. In 
their view, the VC had already taken the decision and presented it to the village 
meeting. 
Perhaps the most important weakness in the process was the unequal knowledge 
among the stakeholders involved. The land law foresees that villages should benefit 
from information provided by district officials when deciding about land transfers. In 
Kidabaga, the villagers and their representatives had an opportunity to question the 
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district officials during at least two meetings of both the VC and the VA. The district 
officer confirmed that he had presented the necessary information about the procedure 
and the villagers’ rights during the meetings. Yet, villagers and village government 
generally had a very low level of awareness and knowledge about statutory law and 
formal procedures to defend their land rights, as I observed throughout the interviews. 
Considering the complexity of land law and the relatively low level of formal education 
overall, it is not surprising that the information shared at a few public meetings is 
insufficient for the majority to fully understand the legal process. Consequently, several 
people in Kidabaga blame the village government and the government in general for not 
having informed them properly about their land rights. This is even more the case in 
Kiwalamo, where people were not involved in formal meetings at all. An interviewee 
claimed: 
The government should have informed us people about land rights and rules before 
the company came. Everybody has rights. But the government just forced us. 
Flaws in the law 
It is unclear whether the customary land rights in Kidabaga and Kiwalamo would have 
been protected, if the process had followed legal procedure as laid down in statutory law 
from the outset. In any case, the decision – or rather the recommendation to the Ministry 
for approval or rejection of the land transfer – could lawfully only be made by the VA 
of Kidabaga. And even if the people of Kiwalamo had been invited to the VA meeting, 
it would still not have been formally possible for them to take part in the decision, as 
they were not residents of that village. Even if the affected villagers of Kidabaga had 
realised the imminent loss of land, they could not have decided whether to accept the 
investor or not on their own. The law does not stipulate that affected individuals or 
households have the sole decision-making power or a right to veto; they can only 
contribute to the decision as VA members. Hence affected individuals could have been 
overruled. But, at least their objections could have been included in the minutes and 
taken into account during decision-making at different levels. Further, affected 
landholders from Kidabaga and Kiwalamo could theoretically have delayed and 
hampered the land transfer by not agreeing to the compensation. It would ultimately 
have been up to the High Court to decide on compensation but not on the transfer of 
Village Land to General Land as such.54 
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One further issue relates to potential relocation. Although the transfer of land did 
not lead directly to resettlement, it might de facto have led landholders of Kiwalamo to 
move to other villages due to lack of sufficient land for their livelihoods. The Village 
Land Act does not foresee such a case of ‘collateral forced resettlement’, and no related 
compensation was paid in the examined case. Both points – affected villagers 
potentially being overruled by VA decisions, and resulting resettlement not being 
compensated in any case – can thus be identified as weaknesses in Tanzanian law. 
Discussion and conclusion 
This study examined the process of transferring village land to an investor against the 
backdrop of an analysis of the local land tenure regime and by highlighting the role of 
actors of the host country government. It focused on the example of a UK-based 
forestry company that acquired land in Tanzania – a country with a legal framework 
that is considered one of the best in Africa in terms of its protection of local land rights. 
The case of Kidabaga and its neighbouring village Kiwalamo I have presented 
illustrates first the importance of a legal pluralism perspective if one wishes to 
understand the complexity of such land transactions and their immediate implications 
for local livelihoods. It was found that customary rights only have some standing vis-à-
vis external stakeholders when they are backed by statutory law. In Tanzania, statutory 
law protects customary law, but only as long as the latter does not go beyond village 
boundaries, as the statutory regulations are based on villages as units. Yet, as we have 
seen, for historical reasons – namely the villagization process – customary tenure 
regimes are not limited to areas within village boundaries. A second limitation on 
statutory law’s protection of customary rights is that it expects the collective decision-
making of Village Assemblies to consider the customary rights of individuals (within 
and beyond village boundaries), but this is not necessarily the case.  
Second, by focusing on the relationships between the stakeholders involved – as 
stipulated by the employed property concept – the study reveals the relevance of power 
inequalities between actors in terms of asserting land rights. When customary law 
conflicts with statutory law, people who represent statutory law – district government 
officers for example – and people who rely on statutory law – for example foreign 
investors – are more successful at imposing their views and claims. This is because the 
institution behind the statutory law, i.e. the state and its representatives, is more 
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powerful than the collectivity behind customary law, namely individual villagers. The 
power inequality is expressed in two main aspects and leads to several weaknesses in 
the implementation of legal procedure: 
• Unequal social relations between government authorities and villagers and 
between members of the Village Council, other villagers and non-village 
members; they lead not only to statutory law being stronger than customary law 
when there are doubts, but also to Village Assembly decisions being influenced 
or pre-decided. Hence there is a risk that powerful village members will take 
decisions that elide interests of weaker villagers and non-village members.  
• Unequal knowledge about land rights of local people compared to 
representatives of the district and the investor; though villagers respect statutory 
law, they have little knowledge of it. Thus, when mistakes occur during the land 
transfer, it is difficult for affected people to defend their rights. The knowledge 
inequalities cannot be balanced out during the process, although state regulations 
contain certain provisions.  
The example from Tanzania shows us that even statutory land law that supposedly 
offers relatively good protection for customary rights does not do so in a foolproof 
manner. This is because of weaknesses in the law, namely regarding collective decision-
making about land transfers and potential ‘collateral forced resettlements’ – weaknesses 
that could arguably be overcome. But more importantly it is because of several flaws 
that can occur during implementation. The study sheds light not only on the influence of 
investors, but on the crucial role and relations of actors at the local and the middle level 
of the host country government – levels that are often missing in land grab literature.55 
Overall, unequal power relations between these actors were found to be most relevant in 
shaping the effects of land deals. The study concludes with German, Schoneveld and 
Mwangi that the law is not sufficient to protect people’s rights.56 The claim that 
transnational land deals can be disciplined by improved regulations is therefore highly 
questionable.57  
The challenges of a land transfer process may affect not only local landholders 
and land users, but may also have negative consequences for the government officials 
involved and for the investor in terms of increased costs, time and workload. For 
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investors, relying on the procedural steps as defined in law and on the respective village 
representatives is no guarantee of a conflict-free land transaction.  
Finally, the analysis illustrated in detail how the flaws during the land transfer 
may have adverse implications for the affected villagers, such as major delays in 
compensation payments and the hardship this causes. In the most extreme cases, this 
may include people losing their land against their will and even having to relocate their 
households due to a shortage of land in the area. Less knowledgeable people, people 
with limited livelihood resources and people living in complex land tenure settlements – 
arguably a significant share of the population of the Global South – are particularly at 
risk. Thus, this study confirms observations made in other contexts that such land 
investments are likely to exacerbate existing social inequalities.58 
In sum, my analysis raises severe doubts as to whether large transnational land 
deals can be conducted in a way that fully respects existing land rights. The findings of 
this study support voices that call for alternative pathways of agrarian development that 
do not affect people’s land rights. 
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